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INTRODUCTION
Like many other nations, the United Kingdom responded to the
September 11 attacks on the United States by passing anti-terrorist
legislation, broadening the rights of the government and curtailing
civil liberties in the name of national security.1 The result was
1. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 21, 26 (Eng.)
(allowing the Home Secretary to detain a foreign national suspected of terrorist
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emergency legislation that authorized the U.K. Home Secretary to
detain foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists.2 Just days after
the enactment of the U.K. anti-terrorist legislation, the Home
Secretary made the first use of his new powers by detaining eight
persons suspected of terrorist activity.3 Three years after this initial
use of powers, the United Kingdom is reconsidering its anti-terrorist
legislation, following a House of Lords decision that ruled that' the
internment powers violated the United Kingdom's international
commitment to basic civil liberties set forth in the European
Convention on Human Rights ("European Convention"). 4 In
response to the House of Lords' decision, the new Home Secretary
introduced a proposal to amend the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 ("Anti-terrorism Act").5 The proposed
amendments present a dramatic departure from the Anti-terrorism
Act by attempting to eliminate the disproportionate and
6
discriminatory nature of the original legislation.

activities for six months before review); Warren Hoge, U.S. Terror Attacks
Galvanize Europeans to Tighten Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at BI
(discussing the proposal and initiation of new anti-terrorism laws in the European
Union, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom).
2. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, § 21 (providing for detention of
foreign nationals when the Home Secretary can demonstrate a reasonable belief or
suspicion that the individual is participating in terrorist activities).
3. See Ian Burrell & Jason Bennetto, Blunkett Provokes Anger by Using New
Terror Laws to Arrest Eight Suspects, INDEP. (London), Dec. 20, 2001, at 1.
4. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56,
73
(holding that the detention of the detainees was disproportional to the perceived
threat to national security and that the Anti-terrorism Act was discriminatory since
it only applied to foreign nationals); Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5
[hereinafter European Convention] (unifying European nations' law regarding the
international enforcement of individual rights).
5. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, §§ 9, 23; 430 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 305-09 (statement of Charles Clarke, Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't) (proposing changes to Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism Act and defending
the continued need for the Anti-terrorism Act by citing national security concerns).
6. See 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 305-09 (statement of Charles
Clarke, Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't) (recommending control orders
consisting of intense surveillance and house arrest of the suspected terrorist in
place of detention).
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While the detainees wait for Parliament to reassess the Antiterrorism Act, the detainees are appealing their detention on other
grounds, including the claim that the United Kingdom based the
detainees' detention on statements obtained through the torture of
detainees held by the United States. 7 The detainees' claim came in
the wake of recently revealed information about the contentious U.S.
treatment of prisoners in Iraq, Cuba, and Afghanistan, 8 which raises
questions about the propriety of some of the powers conferred upon
the executive offices of many nations during the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks.9
Despite the serious nature of the detainees' allegations regarding
the potential of torture-induced evidence, there is a strong likelihood
that Parliament will approve an amendment to the Anti-terrorism Act
that will not address the problem.10 Consequently, the detainees may
look to the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") to gain
redress.1 Should the ECHR hear the case of the British detainees, an
7. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1123,
66, 381-86 (summarizing the detainees' argument that the United Kingdom used
torture-induced evidence against them and acknowledging that the detainees
presented sufficient evidence to prove the potential use of torture in the gathering
of the evidence).
8. See discussion infra Part I.C (providing a general overview of the
allegations of torture committed by the U.S. military).
9. See, e.g., Dana Keith, In the Name of NationalSecurity or Insecurity?: The
Potential Indefinite Detention of Noncitizen Certified Terrorists in the United
States and the United Kingdom in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 405, 451-55 (2004) (considering the implications of Part 4 of the Antiterrorist Act and comparing the U.K. Anti-terrorist Act to the USA PATRIOT
Act).
10. See id. (outlining a plan for changing the Anti-terrorism Act that fails to
address the evidentiary procedures of the Appeals Commission); see also Chris
Moncrieff et al., 'Control Orders' Planfor TerrorSuspects, PRESS ASS'N, Jan. 26,
2005 (quoting MP Michael Meacher as stating that the proposed measures were a
compromise and did not address the low standard of proof, the inability of the
detainees to challenge the evidence against them, and the admissibility of tortureinduced evidence); discussion infra Part II (analyzing the Anti-terrorism Act's
incompatibility with Articles 3 and 6 of the European Convention).
11. See European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the
+Court/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2005) (explaining that the European Convention
established the ECHR to pursue the aims of the Convention and address
complaints by individuals).
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ensuing decision may define the bounds between human liberties and
national security for much of Europe in the age of terrorism. 2
This Comment argues that the British detainees should bring their
case before the ECHR if Parliament neglects to address the potential
use of torture-induced evidence in amending the Anti-terrorism
Act.'3 The ECHR would likely find that the United Kingdom violated
international law when the U.K. Court of Appeal dismissed the
detainees' claim that the U.K. government should prohibit tortureinduced evidence from the legal proceedings that affirmed the
detainees' continued imprisonment. 4 Additionally, it is probable the
ECHR would find that the Court of Appeal wrongfully placed the
burden on the detainees to prove evidence of torture. 5
Part I provides an overview of the background of the detainees'
complaint and explains the applicable provisions of the European
Convention and Anti-terrorism Act. Part II will discuss why the
detainees should bring their case before the European Court of
Human Rights. Part II then considers whether the European
Convention requires Member States to exclude evidence seized by
torture, or whether the States have the option to admit the evidence
and determine the weight accorded to the potentially torture-induced
evidence.
Finally, Part III recommends that the evidence obtained from
torture be excluded completely from proceedings, and that the
method of weighing the evidence is not appropriate under the
12. See discussion infra Conclusion (explaining that the ECHR provides
guidance to many European nations and arguing that the ECHR would admonish
the use of torture-induced evidence should it hear the British detainees' case).
13. See discussion infra Part II (analyzing ECHR case law that suggests the
ECHR may find that the United Kingdom violated Articles 3 and 6 of the

European Convention and contending that the ECHR, as an international body
dedicated to advocacy for human rights, provides a sympathetic forum for the

detainees).
14. See discussion infra Part III.A (arguing that using evidence obtained under

torture in a legal proceeding legitimizes torture, and the prejudicial effect of the
evidence makes the proceeding unfair).
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (analogizing the extraterritorial duties under
Article 3 to the potential obligation for a Member State to assess another State's
means of attaining evidence before the Member State uses the evidence in a
proceeding).
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European Convention. Furthermore, Part III proposes that the
European Court of Human Rights place the burden on the United
Kingdom to prove the non-use of torture, so long as the detainees can
establish an arguable claim that torture induced the evidence. Lastly,
Part III encourages the U.K. Parliament to cease the indefinite use of
closed evidence when it amends the Anti-terrorism Act.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The European Convention is often heralded as history's most
successful international human rights treaty. 6 Much of the European

Convention's success emanates from successfully establishing a
court capable of interpreting and enforcing the provisions of
European Convention. 7 The ECHR considers complaints filed
individuals against Member States and awards compensation to
individuals for violations of the liberties afforded to them in

the
by
the
the

European Convention. 8
16. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT
AND MATERIALS 4 (1995) (noting that the European Convention has "one of the
most advanced forms of any kind of international legal process").
17. See Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights,
http://www.humanrights.coe.int/intro/eng/GENERAL/ECHR.HTM
(last visited
Dec. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Convention Overview] (proclaiming that the
establishment of the ECHR as a supra-national court to overlook judgments of
sovereign States was a historic move for international law and human rights
theory, as it placed the rights of individuals above laws of States).
18. See European Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(5) (granting individuals an
enforceable right to compensation for the illegal deprivation of their liberty); see
also IAIN CAMERON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 48-49 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining that the ECHR cannot reverse

convictions or order new trials and in most cases the only remedy for a State's
violation of an individual's liberty is monetary damages). Member States usually
give strong consideration to the ECHR's holdings, either by issuing new trials for
the complainant or by changing the State's laws to prevent future reoccurrences of
the problem. Id. at 50-51; see, e.g., Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of
Confrontation in the European Court of Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
777, 777-78, 783-84 (2003) (discussing the decision of Spanish authorities to
reopen a case after the ECHR held that the original trial was not fair and violated
Article 6); Convention Overview, supra note 17 (enumerating examples of States
modifying their domestic laws to comport with the holdings of the ECHR). See
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1. Admissibility of Evidence and the Right to a FairTrial
UnderArticle 6 of the European Convention
Article 6 of the European Convention monitors judicial
proceedings that threaten deprivation of an individual's rights under
the European Convention. 9 It requires that all defendants receive a
right to a fair and public hearing and articulates several standards to
meet this requirement. 20 Although it is well-established under the
jurisprudence of the ECHR that the admissibility of evidence is
primarily a matter for national law, the ECHR can find a violation of
Article 6 if it determines that the admissibility of certain evidence
deprived the complainant of a fair trial.21 The ECHR considers a fair
trial to be an adversarial one, where the proceeding embraced the
concept of "equality of arms," giving both parties a "real
opportunity" to examine the evidence before them and comment
thereon.22 Specifically, the ECHR considers whether the domestic
courts respected the rights of the defense by allowing the defense to
generally European Court of Human Rights, Dates of Ratification of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Additional Protocols, http://www.echr.coe.int/
ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/Basic+Texts/Dates+of+ratification+of+the+Europ
ean+Convention+on+Human+Rights+and+Additional+Protocols/ (last visited Dec.
12, 2005) (listing countries that have ratified the European Convention, which
includes the United Kingdom as one of the original signatories).
19. See JANIS ET AL., supra note 16, at 375 (stressing that the primary purpose
of Article Six is to examine whether the civil rights enumerated in the European
Convention are carried out in a fair manner).
20. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 6(3) (enumerating the minimal
standards for a fair hearing as including the right to legal assistance, the right to an
interpreter if needed, and the right to examine witnesses against the person).
21. See BarberA v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1988) (declaring the
defendants' trials unfair because the defendants did not have a chance to
adequately analyze and rebut the evidence presented at trial). In Barberd, a
Spanish court admitted a statement from a witness who did not appear in court
after the witness fled from police. Id. at 12. The ECHR held that the fact that the
defendants never had an opportunity to question the witness contributed to the
unfairness of the proceedings. Id. at 37.
22. See Migon v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 24244-94,
68, 79 (2002),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding
the right to an adversarial proceeding implicit in Articles 5(4) and 6). Migo
involved a complainant imprisoned for aggravated fraud. Id. 8. The State court
limited the access of the complainant and his lawyer to the case file against him,
thereby causing the ECHR to hold that the State violated the complainant's rights
under Article 5(4) of the European Convention. Id. 73-87.
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challenge the legitimacy of the evidence and whether the defense had
the right to question witnesses.23 The ECHR also considers whether
incriminating statements are voluntarily made and questions the
overall quality of the incriminating evidence, including the reliability
and accuracy of such evidence. 4 Finally, it considers whether the
tainted evidence comprises a substantial or decisive basis for a
conviction.
2. Hearsay Evidence and the Right to Confront
Witnesses Under Article 6
Article 6 of the European Convention states that individuals have
the right to confront the witnesses against them.26 When the ECHR
addresses hearsay evidence, it frames the issue in the broader terms
of whether the defendant received a fair trial.27 Two cases that
exemplify the ECHR's application of this principle and reveal some
of the factors the ECHR considers in determining the fairness of a
29
proceeding are Ferrantelliv. Italy28 and Kostovski v. Netherlands.
a.

Ferrantelli v. Italy

Under Ferrantelli, the ECHR may consider the reason for a
witness' absence and any corroborating evidence in determining
whether the admission of the absent witness' statements resulted in

23. See, e.g., Allan v. United Kingdom, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 56.
24. See id. (reasoning that there is much less of a need for corroborating

evidence when the evidence is strong and there is no risk of the evidence being
unreliable). In this regard, the ECHR requires an inquiry into whether admissions

against the defendant resulted from inducement, entrapment or similar means. Id.
25. See Schenk v. Switzerland, 140 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29-30 (1988)
(holding that the use of illegally-obtained evidence does not necessarily cause a

trial to be unfair, placing the emphasis instead on whether the State courts carefully
considered the admission of the evidence and whether the evidence was the sole
reason for the defendant's conviction).
26. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 6(3)(d).
27. See Kirst, supra note 18, at 782 (noting that if hearsay evidence imposes

many handicaps on the defense, the ECHR is likely to consider the use of the
hearsay evidence unfair).
28. 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, 938.
29. 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1989).
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an unfair trial.30 In Ferrantelli the complainants claimed that the
State violated their right to a fair trial under Article 6, in part because
the evidence presented at their trial included statements made by a
witness whom the defense was unable to question before the witness'
death.31 The ECHR considered the admission of the statements at
trial and ruled that Italy did not violate the right to confrontation
since the government was not responsible for the witness' death and
additional evidence supported the witness' statements that the
defendants assisted the witness in the commission of the crime.32
Ferrantelli demonstrated that the right of confrontation is not
absolute, so long as the State has a legitimate rationale for denying
the right of confrontation and the State respects the right of the
defense.33
b. Kostovski v. Netherlands
Kostovski considered the admissibility of anonymous witness
statements.34 In Kostovski the State court convicted the defendant on
the basis of accounts from two anonymous witnesses who did not
appear before the defendant in court.35 Although the judge allowed
30. Ferrantelli, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 950-51 (declaring that the State's use
of statements from a deceased witness at trial did not violate the right to a fair trial
because the State was not responsible for the witness' death and corroborating
evidence supported the witness' statements).
31. Id. at 947. Ferrantelliinvolved the arrest of three individuals suspected of
murdering two Italian police officers. Id. at 942. One of the three suspects admitted
to the murders and implicated the other two suspects during a police interrogation,
but the next day retracted his statements regarding the involvement of the other
two suspects. Id. After the accomplice retracted his statements, Italian authorities
found him hanged in a prison hospital under questionable circumstances, but
determined his death a suicide. Id. at 943. The complainant implied that the
accomplice, who only had one arm, would have had a difficult time hanging
himself and noted that, strangely, authorities found a handkerchief in the
accomplice's mouth. Id.
32. Id. at 950-51 (referring to the fact that the two suspects did not have alibis
and there was evidence they assisted in buying the gas bottles used in the attacks).
33. See id. at 951.
34. Kostovski, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19-21 (questioning whether the use
of anonymous witness statements makes a trial unfair, thereby contravening the
European Convention).
35. Id. at 10 (noting that the witnesses feared retaliation from their testimony).
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the defense counsel to submit a list of questions for the witnesses, the
judge only asked the witness two of the defense's fourteen
questions.36 In a strongly worded opinion, the ECHR disapproved of
the use of the anonymous statements at trial, particularly since the
conviction relied "to a decisive extent" on the anonymous
statements.37 The ECHR held that the use of the statements, without
better safeguards set up to protect the rights of the defense,
constituted a violation of the Article 6 right to a fair trial because
such statements do not allow the defendant to confront his accusers. 38
3. Article 3: The Absolute ProhibitionAgainst Torture
Article 3 of the European Convention states that "[n]o one shall be
subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."3 9 Article 3 serves the important purpose of elucidating
the rule of law principle set forth in the Preamble.4" The importance
placed on Article 3 is also apparent by the prohibition of Article 3's
derogation by Article 15.4"

36. Id. at 11 (stating that the judge felt that the other twelve questions
submitted by the defense counsel might disclose the identity of the witnesses).
37. Id. at 21 (maintaining that although the European Convention does not rule
out reliance on anonymous witnesses, the use of anonymous witness testimony as
the basis for a conviction "is a different matter").
38. Id. at 20 (reasoning that the anonymity of the witness prevents the defense
from ascertaining the veracity, partiality, or reliability of the statements).
39. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
40. See id. pmbl. (agreeing to the core values of "political traditions, ideals,
freedom and the rule of law"); Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 16-17 (1975) (looking to the Preamble for the object and purpose of the
European Convention and concluding that the "rule of law" constitutes a founding
principle of the European Convention); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 31(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15, reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 543 (requiring States to turn to the preamble of a treaty for interpretation
of the treaty's purpose).
41. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 15 (prohibiting derogation from
Articles 2, 4, and 7, in addition to Article 3).

288

AM. U. INT'L L. REv.

[21:277

a. The State's Obligation to Investigate Claims of Torture

States have an obligation under the European Convention to
investigate complaints of torture or ill-treatment.42 This obligation
arises whenever an individual raises an "arguable claim"' 43 of torture
or ill treatment by State authorities. 44 The ECHR holds that the duty
to investigate claims of torture is implied under both Articles 3 and
13 of the European Convention.45

42. Id. art. 13.
43. See Silver and Others v. United Kingdom, 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42
(1983) (holding that Member States of the European Convention should have
domestic remedies available for persons bringing arguable claims concerning
alleged breaches of the Convention, and stipulating that these remedies should
include an opportunity to have the claim decided and redressed if appropriate).
Because the ECHR did not define the concept of "arguable," national authorities
must interpret the term on a case-by-case basis. See Committee of Ministers,
Council of Europe, Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(98)13 of
the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on the Right of Rejected Asylum Seekers
to an Effective Remedy Against Decisions on Expulsion in the Context of Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 641st mtg. 13 (1998) [hereinafter
Comm. of Ministers Recommendation] (explaining that in cases of asylumseeking, some nations have interpreted an arguable claim as a claim that "contains
substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk... [of] treatment contrary
to Article 3 of the Convention").
44. See European Convention, supra note 4, art. 1; Ireland v. United Kingdom,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66 (1978) (finding a distinction between ill treatment
and torture). In Ireland,the ECHR considered the use of interrogation practices by
British officials on the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), a terrorist organization
determined to end British rule of Northern Ireland. Id. at 11. Among the techniques
considered were wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep,
and deprivation of food and drink. Id. at 41. The ECHR held that while these
techniques were "inhuman and degrading," they were not intense or severe enough
to be considered torture. Id. at 66-67; see also Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII Eur.
Ct. HR. 3264, 3290 (reading Article 3 in conjunction with Article 1 to establish an
obligation for the State to investigate claims of torture or ill-treatment).
45. See Aydin v. Turkey, 1997-V Eur. H.R. Rep. 1866 (finding a violation for
the State's failure to conduct an investigation into allegations of torture under
Article 13). The ECHR held that such inaction violates Article 13 of the European
Convention and did not explain why it placed this obligation under Article 13
instead of Article 3. Id. at 300; cf Assenov, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3290
(interpreting a duty to investigate claims of torture under Article 3). The ECHR
cases suggest that the court looks to the broader wording of Article 3 when there is
not conclusive evidence in the complaint to reach a finding of torture or illtreatment. See A.R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN
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b. ExtraterritorialApplication ofArticle 3

In Soering v. United Kingdom the ECHR placed Article 3
responsibility on the United Kingdom for the U.K.'s plan to extradite
a German citizen to the United States to stand trial for capital murder
charges.46 The ECHR recognized the strong public interest in
bringing fleeing criminals to justice, but reasoned that the U.K.
decision to extradite the individual would directly result in a
foreseeable violation of Article 3 due to the use of the death penalty
in the United States.47 The ECHR referred to Article 3 of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture ("Convention Against
Torture"), which explicitly prohibits extradition of a person to a
country where there is a substantial risk of torture, and held that the
same obligation is inherent under Article 3 of the European
Convention.48

B. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE BRITISH DETAINEES
AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT

1.

The British Detainees' Indefinite Imprisonment

Although the United Kingdom began imprisoning foreign
nationals suspected of terrorism almost four years ago,49 the public
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 63 (2004) (theorizing that the ECHR only turns to

Article 3 in exceptional cases of a State's failure to investigate claims of torture).
46. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1989)
(explaining that the applicant admitted to the murder of two people in Virginia).
47. Id. at 39 (finding that the applicant faced a serious risk of receiving the
death penalty).
48. Id. at 34-35 (implying that a specialized treaty may spell out obligations
inherent in the provisions and ideals of the European Convention). This case
represented the first time the ECHR applied Article 3 responsibility to a Member
State for actions that occur outside a Member State's jurisdiction. Id. at 33-34.
49. See David Barrett, Eight Are Detained Under Terrorism Act, LIVERPOOL
DAILY POST, Dec. 20, 2001, at 3 (noting that Home Secretary David Blunkett
wasted little time in exercising the newly endowed powers bestowed upon him by
the Anti-terrorism Act); see also Robert Verkaik, We Say in a Democracy It Is
Unacceptable to Lock Up Potentially Innocent People Without Trial or Without
Any Indication When, if Ever, They Are Going to Be Released: Ben Emmerson QC
Opens the Case of A and Others vs. the Home Secretary, INDEP. (London), Oct. 5,
2004 (explaining that British officials detained nine men just hours after the Anti-
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knows little about the detainees the United Kingdom holds.5 0 Yet
recent reports reveal that the detainees may be suffering from mental
health problems." The uncertainty of their detention seems to bring
more hardship to the detainees than their imprisonment. 2 This
uncertainty has proved so unbearable that at least one of the
detainees is seriously considering choosing deportation to his home
country of Algeria, where he faces possible torture or death upon his
return, rather than continuing to face unspecified charges and
imprisonment in the United Kingdom.53 The detainees remain
imprisoned while they appeal their detention 4 and wait for
terrorism Act came into force). As of October 2004, a total of seventeen people
had been detained, twelve of whom were still incarcerated. Id.
50. See Nick Cohen, Guantanamo UK, OBSERVER, Dec. 14, 2003, at 29
(implying that the United Kingdom purposely keeps the British detainees out of the
press to prevent criticism of the Anti-terrorism Act); see also Martin Bright,
Prisoner 'A': No Charge, No Trial, No Conviction, and No Release Date. Welcome
to Britain's War on Terror, OBSERVER, Aug. 29, 2004, at 12 (explaining how the
public and courts refer to individual detainees by a letter of the alphabet assigned
to identify each detainee due to a court order safeguarding the anonymity of the
detainees and their families).
51. See Ian Robbins et al., The Psychiatric Problems of Detainees Under the
2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2004, at 4, http://www.libertyhuman-rights.org.uk/issues/intemment-psychiatric-report.PDF (reporting on the
physical and mental conditions of the detainees and finding that the overwhelming
health concern with the detainees is mental deterioration); Robert Verkaik,
Belmarsh Detainees: Terror Suspects are Mentally Ill After Torture, Warn
Doctors, INDEP. (London), Oct. 14, 2004, at 4 (detailing findings that showed that
all the detainees are suffering from mental illness, have considered suicide, and
some have even intentionally harmed themselves); see also Bright, supra note 50
(stating that many of the detainees take antidepressants); Sanjay Suri, Britain's
Guantanamo, INT'L PRESS SERV.,
June 24,
2004, available at
http://www.antiwar.com/ips/suri.php?articleid=2868 (explaining that officials had
to transfer the detainee known as "G" to a mental facility after he suffered
psychotic attacks).
52. See Bright, supra note 50 (conveying information obtained by an interview
with a detainee who expressed his despair at the "unknowns" of his situation).
53. See id.
54. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 25, 27
(considering the Appeals Commission's review as a fact-based appeal from the
Home Secretary's decision, and providing further appeal on questions of law). In
accordance with the Anti-terrorism Act, the Appeals Commission reviewed the
certification of each of the detainees now appealing their imprisonment. See Dept.
for Constitutional Affairs, Special Immigration Appeals Commission,
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/legalprof/judgments/siac/siac.htm (last visited
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Parliament to reevaluate the Anti-terrorist Act following the advisory
opinion of the House of Lords that found the Anti-terrorism Act

incompatible with the European Convention.55
2. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 Gives the
U.K. Home Secretary a DraconianPower over Non-citizens
The origins of the Anti-terrorism Act stem from the United
Kingdom's response to the September 11 attacks on the United
States.56 In an attempt to remain compliant with the European
Convention, the United Kingdom opted out of Article 5 of the
European Convention, which guarantees that States will not unjustly
imprison individuals. 7 The conflict between the European
Convention and the Anti-terrorism Act arises from Part 4 of the Antiterrorism Act, which gives the U.K. Home Secretary unfettered

Dec. 12, 2005) (listing decisions of the Commission). The Commission affirmed
the detainees' continued detention, based in large part on closed evidence. See,
e.g., E v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2003] UKSIAC 4/2002,
2, 11.
55. Compare Law Teacher.net, Parliamentary Sovereignty, http://www.law
teacher.net/ELS/Law%20Making/Parlsoveriegn.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2005)
(explaining the concept of parliamentary sovereignty and stating that no judicial
body can amend or reverse a law Parliament approves), with Joshua Rozenberg,
Second Advocate Resigns Over Detainees Held Without Trial, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jan. 17, 2005, at 4 (explaining the erosion of the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty by an agreement based on the Human Rights Act that
promises that the U.K. Parliament will amend any legislation the ECHR declares
incompatible with the European Convention).
56. See Virginia Helen Henning, Comment, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom Made a Valid Derogationfrom the
European Convention on Human Rights?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1263, 1264-70
(2002) (noting the United Kingdom's strong stance behind the United States
following the September 11 attacks and detailing the history of the Anti-terrorism
Act's swift passage through Parliament).
57. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (Eng.) (incorporating the European
Convention into domestic law and ordering that domestic laws be interpreted so
that they are compatible with the provisions of the European Convention); see also
The Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I.
3644/2001, art. 2, available at http://www.uk-legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si!si200l/
20013644.htm (derogating from Article 5(1) of the European Convention since the
expansive powers of the Anti-terrorism Act threatened the United Kingdom's
compliance with the European Convention); European Convention, supra note 4,
art. 5 (guaranteeing individuals threatened with the deprivation of their liberty the
right to certain procedures meant to guard against unjustified imprisonment).
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power to detain a foreign national without review for a minimum of
six months. 8 Six months after the Home Secretary's detention of the
individual, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission ("Appeals
Commission") reviews the detainee's case and affirms the need for
continued detention if the Appeals Commission believes there is a
reasonable belief or suspicion the suspect is involved in terrorist
activity. 9
According to the Appeals Commission's own procedural rules, the
Appeals Commission may consider evidence that would normally be
inadmissible in a court of law. 60 The Commission may appoint a
Special Advocate to protect the detainee's interests, 61 but the
procedural rules do not allow the Special Advocate to take
instructions from the detainees or discuss the evidence with them
absent special permission from the Appeals Commission.62
Furthermore, the procedural rules specify that the Appeals
Commission may deny the detainees access to the evidence against
them if it concludes that such access could compromise national
security concerns.63 The detainees may appeal any ruling by the
58. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, §§ 21-26 (setting a procedure for
the detention and appeal of suspected international terrorists whereby the Home
Secretary may detain a foreign national on the basis of a reasonable belief or
suspicion the individual has links to terrorism).
59. See id. § 26 (granting review upon a detainee's application for appeal or
under the Commission's own determination that a review is necessary because of a
change in the state of affairs). The Anti-terrorism Act requires the Appeals
Commission to review appeals "as soon as is reasonably practicable" following the
six month period. Id. Further, it provides that the reasonable suspicion needed to
affirm the continued detention can arise from the individual's acts, membership in
terrorist organizations, or links to terrorist groups. Id. § 21.
60. Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules, 2003, S.I.
2003/1034, § 44 (relaying the rules of evidence that govern the Appeals
Commission's procedures, including, for example, a provision allowing witness
testimony in either oral or written form).
61. Id. §§ 34-35 (allowing the special advocate to make submissions at any
hearings from which the government excludes the detainees).
62. Id. § 36 (specifying that the detainee may only communicate with the
special advocate in writing, and the special advocate may not respond to the
detainee's communication, except to acknowledge the receipt of the written
communication).
63. See id. § 37 (granting the U.K. Home Secretary the right to submit closed
materials to the Appeals Commission and requiring the Secretary to provide the
Special Advocate with a copy of the material, the reasons for the material's
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Appeals Commission concerning a question of law to the Court of
Appeal. 64
3. The Detainees'First Appeal: Convincing the House
of Lords that the Anti-terrorism Act Is
DiscriminatoryandDisproportionate

The detainees' first appeal ended before the House of Lords,
where the detainees convinced the Law Lords that the United
Kingdom violated the European Convention by distributing rights
and freedoms in a discriminatory manner 65 and imposing severe
limitations on civil rights beyond what the perceived threat of
terrorism justified.66 Following the House of Lords decision, the
Home Secretary proposed changes to the Anti-terrorism Act meant to
67
eliminate its discriminatory and disproportionate provisions.
Among the proposed changes is a recommendation to broaden the
scope of the Anti-terrorism Act, so that the provisions apply to all
persons, irrespective of nationality.68 Moreover, the Secretary
disclosure, and if possible, a statement of the material in a form that will not
threaten public interest and that can be served to the detainee). The Appeals
Commission may hold a hearing on the Secretary's request for closed evidence and
choose to uphold or deny the secrecy of the evidence. Id. § 38. Should the Appeals
Commission deny the Secretary's request for concealment, the Secretary may
decide against using the evidence in the Appeals Commission proceedings. Id.
64. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, § 25 (allowing appeals if
brought within the first three months of detention or with the approval of the
Commission).
65. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, 33 (finding the
Anti-terrorism Act discriminatory since it only applies to foreign nationals when
there exists a genuine threat of terrorism from British citizens as well).
66. Id. 43 (characterizing the Anti-terrorism Act as disproportional because
the Act has the potential for detaining persons who do not pose a threat, and yet the
Anti-terrorism Act does not fully address the claimed threat of national security
since the measures only apply to non-citizens).
67. See 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 305-09 (statement of Charles
Clark, Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't) (defending the survival of the Antiterrorism Act and introducing "control orders" in the form of house arrest for all
persons the Home Secretary suspects of terrorist involvement but cannot prosecute
for a particular reason).
68. See id. at 307 (acknowledging that the proposal to apply the Anti-terrorism
Act to all persons, including British citizens, represents a dramatic increase in the
power of the Home Secretary, but contending that such an increase in power is
necessary to combat terrorism).
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proposed house arrest in lieu of imprisonment for persons accused of
terrorism under the Anti-terrorism Act. 69 However, the Secretary
refused to release the current detainees to house arrest until
Parliament approved new legislation.7"
4. The Detainees' Second Appeal: Questioningthe Evidence
Under the Provisions of the European Convention

The detainees also challenged their detention by claiming that the
British government used torture-induced evidence in the Appeals
Commission proceedings that determined the need for the detainees'
continued detention.7" Although Parliament and the Home Secretary
are considering amendments to the Anti-terrorism Act, neither
Parliament nor the Secretary have introduced amendments that
address the evidentiary procedures that allow for the potential use of
torture-induced evidence.72
On August 11, 2004, the Court of Appeal addressed the use of
torture-induced evidence in the Appeals Commission proceedings.73
69. See id. at 308 (adding that the surveillance and restrictions would vary
depending on the threat each individual posed).
70. See id. (justifying his decision not to release the detainees because of the
threat they pose, and adding that he would only revoke their detention if the threat
changes). While the possibility of house arrest rather than imprisonment is
generally good news for the detainees, at least two of the detainees are making a
stance by stating that they may choose to remain detained since house arrest would
only "be replacing one type of indefinite detention without trial with another." See
Karen Mcveigh, TerrorSuspects May Opt for Jail Over House Arrest, SCOTSMAN,
Feb. 1, 2005, at 4.
71. See generally Diana Muriel, Thwarting Terror Cells in Europe, CNN, Jan.
23, 2002, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/25/
thwarting.cells/index.html (averring that the use of torture during the interrogation
of suspected terrorist Djamel Beghal led to arrests of other suspected terrorists in
Europe).
72. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56,
71
(expressing no opinion on the detainees' claims of alleged breaches of Articles 3
and 6); 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 305-09 (statement of Charles Clark,
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't) (focusing only on the proportionality and
discriminatory provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act for the proposed amendments).
73. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1123,
85,
126 (upholding the Appeals Commission's use of the evidence based in part on the
view that investigating the evidence could hinder the cooperation of the United
Kingdom with other nations in the global effort to thwart terrorism).
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All three justices dismissed the detainees' first argument that
admission of torture-induced evidence violated obligations under the
Convention Against Torture. 4 Two of the justices also dismissed a
similar argument that the admission of evidence that was possibly
torture-induced violated the European Convention.7 5 These justices
agreed that weighing the evidence provided appropriate protection
under the Article 6 fair trial standard.76
74. See id.
119, 266, 434 (reasoning that the United Kingdom had not
incorporated the Convention Against Torture into U.K. domestic law and
maintaining that the courts possess no authority to apply international law until it is
incorporated into a statute). The detainees alleged that the United Kingdom used
torture-induced evidence in the detainees' legal proceedings, and that this directly
violated Article 15 of the Convention Against Torture, which prohibits the use of
any statements "established to have been made as a result of torture" as evidence in
any proceeding. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, art. 15, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture]. The Committee Against Torture-the intemational body established to
monitor the implementation of the Convention Against Torture-considered the
extraterritorial application of Article 15 in P.E. v. France. See P.E. v. France,
Communication No. 193/2001, U.N. CAT, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/29/D/193/2001 (2001), available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/
UNCAT/2002/14.html [hereinafter UNCAT Communication]. P.E. involved the
arrest of a German national in France for suspicion of involvement with a terrorist
organization. Id.
1.2, 2.1. Spain requested extradition of the German national
based on a statement from a third party implicating the individual in a plot to
attack the Spanish air force. Id. 2.4. Before France could extradite the German
national, the third party retracted his accusation, claiming that Spanish officials
tortured him during questioning. Id. 5.4. Nevertheless, French courts agreed to
the extradition. Id. 2.13. When the Committee Against Torture considered P.E.,
the threshold issue was whether Article 15 engaged the responsibility of a Member
State to question a third State's methods of obtaining information. Id. 4.14. The
Committee Against Torture held that, while France had a duty to ascertain the
veracity of the allegations, it was ultimately for the complainant to "demonstrate
that [the] allegations are well-founded." Id. TT 6.3-6.6.
75. A, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1123, 83 (recalling that the ECHR regularly holds
that admission of evidence is a matter for national courts to decide).
76. Id. 84 (highlighting the complainant's argument regarding the submission
of the evidence allegedly obtained through torture and concluding that weighing
the evidence is appropriate since it is not certain whether torture induced the
statements). But see id. 426 (Neuberger, L.J., dissenting) (proclaiming that the
prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed the evidence's probative value, and
the court should exclude the statements from the Appeals Commission's
proceedings). Justice Neuberger maintained that the burden of proving the absence
of torture should fall on the prosecution since the Home Secretary is the party
attempting to rely on the statements. Id. TT 503-13. He suggested a balance of
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C. THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THE UNITED STATES MAY
BE ENGAGING IN PRACTICES OF TORTURE AND
ILL-TREATMENT IN THE CUSTODY AND
INTERROGATION OF U.S. DETAINEES

The detainees' claim that the United Kingdom is using tortureinduced evidence provided by the United States is particularly
important given recent reports accusing the United States of
engaging in torture in Cuba, Afghanistan, and Iraq as a tactic to fight
the War on Terror.77 While the Bush administration stated that it
employs "unconventional methods" to fight the war,78 it denies that
the U.S. military engages in torture or other forms of ill-treatment.7 9
This denial contradicts an increasing amount of evidence suggesting
the U.S. military actively employs tactics that fit in the realm of illtreatment or torture.8°
The most detailed account of life inside Guantanamo Bay comes
from three British detainees whom the United States released without
charge in March 2004, after nearly two and a half years of
detention.81 The former detainees claimed that, inter alia, the military

probabilities standard for the prosecution to overcome, preferring the civil standard
rather than the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as the
criminal standard would require undue hardship of the government since the
government was not a party to the interrogations. Id. 514.
77. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (illustrating, through personal
accounts and the exposure of classified government documents, the evidence
suggesting the United States may be engaging in torture in its fight against
terrorism).
78. See Bush Accuses Kerry of Misunderstanding Terror Threat, THE
FRONTRUNNER, Oct. 12, 2004.
79. See Patrick E. Tyler, Ex-Guantanamo Detainee Charges Beating, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A10 (quoting a Pentagon spokesperson as saying that all
detainees are treated humanely in accordance with the Geneva Convention); see
also Bush Denies Ordering Torture of Detainees, Releases Official Documents,
THE FRONTRUNNER, June 23, 2004 (quoting President Bush as stating, "[w]e do
not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture").
80. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
81.

See SHAFIQ RASUL

ET AL.,

COMPOSITE STATEMENT:

DETENTION

IN

AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO BAY
2, 56 (2004) (reporting on the three
detainees' experiences in American custody in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay).
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beat them, threatened them with dogs,82 systematically deprived them
of sleep,83 subjected them to hours of short-shackling at freezing
85
temperatures, 84 and exposed them to deafening music.
Other accounts by detainees and unnamed government sources
corroborate the composite statement of the three British detainees.86
One military official, Specialist Shawn Baker, described a training
drill gone awry, where his commander ordered him to put on an
orange jump suit and pose as a detainee.87 Officials, who did not
realize Specialist Baker was posing for training, attacked him,
slamming his head against the floor, resulting in a traumatic brain
injury to Specialist Baker. 8 In addition, Moazam Begg, a British
detainee at Guantanamo Bay, claimed he witnessed the deaths of two
detainees "at the hands of the U.S. military personnel" in a letter his
attorney assumed must have passed through the censor by mistake.89

82. See id.
269-71 (claiming that military guards intimidated the detainees
with dogs and one of the dogs attacked a detainee, severely injuring the detainee's
leg).
83. See id. 52 (explaining that the guards constantly moved the detainees
throughout the night to prevent them from sleeping).
84. See id. 183 (describing short-shackling as an uncomfortable position
where the detainee's hands and feet are tied together for long periods of time).
85. See id. 226. Additionally, there was often a lack of food, water, and
clothing at holding sites in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay and the detainees
were so dehydrated and famished that they attacked one another over food. Id.
6-7, 65. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved at least some of this
harsh treatment at Guantanamo Bay. See Bush Denies Ordering Torture of
Detainees, Releases Official Documents, supra note 79 (pointing out that in
November 2002, Rumsfeld approved techniques such as the use of dogs to threaten
detainees and wall-standing for up to four hours).
86. See, e.g., Global Policy Forum, Guantanamo Bay PrisonersComplain of a
Year
Long
Torture
by
U.S.
Military,
Mar.
26,
2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/analysis/2003/O326gua.htm (last visited Dec. 12,
2005) (recounting that many of the detainees had diarrhea and tuberculosis, and
that intelligence agents beat and tortured the detainees).
87. See Bush Denies Ordering Torture of Detainees, Releases Official
Documents, supra note 79 (conveying Specialist Baker's account of the incident
and noting that the drill was meant to train the guards how to handle uncooperative
detainees).
88. See id.
89. See Richard Alleyne & Nick Britten, Briton's Letter 'Tells of Torture in
Guantanamo,'DAILYTELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 2, 2004, at 13 (relaying Moazam
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The reported deaths of two detainees who died in the same week in
December 2002 support Mr. Begg's claims. 90
A Department of Justice memorandum written in August 2002
indicates the allegations of torture may bear some substance. 91 The
memorandum surfaced in the press and revealed that the Bush
administration considered ways of justifying the use of torture under
92
international law.

II. ANALYSIS
The British detainees should bring their claim regarding the
potential use of torture-induced evidence before the ECHR if the
detainees lose their appeal and Parliament does not address the
troublesome evidentiary procedures of the Appeals Commission. 93

Begg's statements that the military subjected him and other detainees to torture and
created a terrifying interrogation environment).
90. See Peter Slevin, U.S. Pledges to Avoid Torture; Pledge on Terror Suspects
Comes Amid Probes of Two Deaths, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at All (showing
that although military pathologists blamed a heart attack for one death and a blood
clot in the lung for the other death, both bodies exhibited injuries attributable to
blunt force trauma). The deaths of the two detainees occurred in Bagram in
December 2002, the same time Mr. Bregg was held there. Id.
91. See Shameful Revelations Will Haunt Bush, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2004, at
1.
92. See id. (noting that the memorandum interpreted the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and the U.S. ratification of the treaty as tolerating
torture under some circumstances). The interpretations are based on a narrow
definition of torture, the president's authority during war-time, and immunity
through self-defense and necessity defenses. Id.; see also Louis-Philippe F.
Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International Law:
The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 9 (2005);
Kathleen Clark & Julie Mertus, Torturing the Law: The Justice Department's
Legal Contortions on Interrogation,WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at B3 (setting
forth arguments against the memorandum which suggest the Department of Justice
was attempting to circumvent international law). See generally United States Dept.
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, About OLC, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ (last
visited Nov. 21, 2005) (noting that the agency serves as legal advisor to the
President and executive agencies and provides written and oral legal opinions upon
the request of the President).
93. See Council of Europe, Notes for the Guidance of Persons Wishing to
Apply to the European Court of Human Rights,
6 (2004),
http://portal.coe.ge/downloads/NOTES-ENG.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2005)
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The ECHR, as an international guardian for the protection of basic
human rights and civil liberties, is likely to be a sympathetic forum
for the British detainees whom the United Kingdom have imprisoned
indefinitely without charge or a proper trial to establish the
detainees' guilt or innocence. 94 At least two articles of the European
Convention call into question the United Kingdom's use of third
party statements obtained under torture. First, the ECHR may
question whether the United Kingdom's use of hearsay evidence, and
the limited adversarial nature of the Appeals Commission
proceedings, denied the detainees their right to a fair trial under
Article 6. 91 Second, the ECHR may consider whether the absolute
prohibition against torture in Article 3 prohibits the use of evidence
obtained under torture.9 6
A.

STATES

MUST EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER

TORTURE OF THIRD PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER ARTICLE 6
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

It is probable that the ECHR would hold that the admission of the
questionable evidence in the detainees' proceedings resulted in an
unfair trial. The examination of the Appeals Commission
proceedings demonstrate an overall unfairness due to the detainees'
limited rights in the proceedings, the inability to question witnesses,
the possibility of coerced statements and related lack of reliability
and accuracy from such statements, and the substantial reliance of
the Appeals Commission on the questionable evidence. Given the
totality of these inequitable conditions, the ECHR would likely find

(stating that an individual may only turn to the ECHR for help after the individual
has exhausted all domestic remedies).
94. See Rozenberg, supra note 55 (noting that the United Kingdom is likely to
fear an application to the ECHR since the ECHR would almost certainly agree
with the House of Lords).
95. See discussion infra Part II.A (examining whether the Appeals Commission
adequately safeguarded the detainees' rights and whether the admission of the third
party statements harmed the fairness of the proceedings).
96. See discussion infra Part II.B (finding that the ECHR would likely consider
the use of evidence obtained under torture a violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention).
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that the Court of Appeals' decision to weigh the evidence did not
adequately protect the detainees from the danger of an unfair trial.
1. The EvidentiaryRules of the Appeals Commission Proceedings
Did Not Adequately Protect the Detainees'Rights
The proceedings of the Appeals Commission presented a number
of disadvantages to the detainees in their efforts to defend themselves
against the government's claims of their involvement in terrorist
activities.97 Even the U.K. Parliament itself acknowledged the
unfairness of the proceedings and made special mention of two of the
more worrisome problems with the evidentiary procedures: the
unknown nature of the closed evidence and the limits on the special
advocate to safeguard the detainees' interests. 98
While the Appeals Commission provides for a special advocate to
oversee the detainees' interests, the restraint against conferring with
the detainees prevents the special advocate from doing little more
than pointing out obvious problems in the evidence.99 Moreover, the
97. See generally Ferrantelli v. Italy, 1996-Ili Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, 950
(proclaiming that, even though admissibility of evidence is generally a matter for
the States to determine, the State must respect the rights of the defense in regards
to the fairness of the evidentiary procedures to satisfy the fair trial requirement
under Article 6).
98. See, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED KINGDOM
PARLIAMENT, FIFTH REPORT
51-59 (2003) (stating that the limited role of the
special advocate and the closed evidence prevents the detainees from dealing with
the accusations against them in a meaningful manner). The Joint Committee on
Human Rights defined "closed evidence" as evidence withheld from the detainee
for reasons of national security. Id. Notwithstanding its concern regarding these
evidentiary procedures, the Joint Committee felt that the potential threat to the
nation justified the inequality in the proceedings. Id. See generally Parliament,
Joint Committee on Human Rights, http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentarycommittees/joint-committee on human-rights.cfm (explaining that the Joint
Committee on Human Rights is made up of members of Parliament who oversee
and provide proposals for issues concerning the Human Rights Act 1998).
99. See S v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKSIAC 25/2003, 39,
available
at
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/legalprof/j udgments/siac/
outcomes/sc252003(s).htm (acknowledging the difficulty the special advocate
faces in making an effective challenge to the evidence without conferring with the
detainee); see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 98,

51-59

(addressing the problems the special advocate faces in defending a detainee, and
noting that while the special advocate may apply to the Appeals Commission for
permission to discuss the evidence with the detainee, there are no criteria for
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secrecy of the evidence precluded the detainees from proving their
innocence by providing alibis or innocent explanations to rebut the
accusatory statements. 10 0 In essence, the procedural rules prevented
the detainees from attaining the equality of arms balance that the
ECHR has consistently upheld as inherent to an adversarial process
and fair trial.101 This lack of an adversarial challenge to the closed

evidence tainted the truth-finding process and prevented the Appeals
Commission from making a fully informed
suspiciousness of the detainees.102

decision on the

The inequitable process continued throughout the detainees'
appeal, as the Home Secretary also denied the appellate court access
to the closed evidence. 0 3 This denial of access to decisive evidence
forced the Court of Appeal to rely solely on the judgment of the
Appeals Commission in regards to the evidence, and effectively
denied the detainees a real opportunity to appeal the judgment of the
deciding these requests). But see Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93,
23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 471-72 (1996) (proposing in dicta the Canadian
Immigration Act as a model for balancing national security and the adversarial
process). The Canadian Immigration Act sets forth the procedures that the United
Kingdom subsequently replicated in Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 by allowing for the use of closed evidence, provided a securitycleared counsel represents the rights of the defense. Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. I2, § III (1985).
100. See Cohen, supra note 50; see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REv. 953, 1001-02 (2002) (recognizing a similar problem with the use of secret
evidence in immigration proceedings in the United States). The author found that
once the U.S. courts forced the government to reveal the evidence, many detained
immigrants were able to rebut the evidence and prove their innocence. Id.
101. The consistency of the ECHR in upholding the need for adversarial
proceedings by giving both the prosecutor and the detainees an equal footing with
which to participate is best seen in cases such as Migon v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
App. No. 24244-94, 68 (2002); Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 24 (1979); and Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, App. No. 9862/82, 9 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 71 (1987).
102. See The Use of Secret Evidence in Immigration Proceedingsand H.R. 2121
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of David
Cole, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2000/cole.html
[hereinafter Use of Secret
Evidence].
103. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1123, 69
(acknowledging that the Court of Appeal would prefer to work with "established
facts than with hypotheses").
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subordinate Appeals Commission. 1°4 In light of the palpable inequity
of arms, the ECHR may find that the secrecy of the evidence and the
limits on the special advocate denied the detainees the opportunity to
challenge the reliability and significance of the evidence. 0 5
2. The ECHR Would Likely Recognize that the Inability of the
Detainees to Question Witnesses Contributedto the Overall
Unfairness of the Appeals Commission Proceedings

The detainees' case also presents the added problem of hearsay
evidence, which the European Convention explicitly prohibits
through the Right of Confrontation in Article 6.106 Yet the United
Kingdom could attempt to invoke the Ferrantelli exception by
convincing the ECHR that the Right of Confrontation should not

104. See Schops v. Germany, App. No. 25116/94, 44 (2001), available at
(requiring appellate
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
courts to review both procedural and substantive judicial procedures, and
explaining that the substantive examination should entail consideration into
whether the detention is lawful by examining the reasonableness of the suspicion
upon which the detention is based).
105. See Allan v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 48539/99, 43
(2002) (suggesting that courts may meet the Article 6 requirement of a fair trial by
allowing the defendant to challenge the authenticity of the evidence). In Allan, the
defendant argued that the State convicted him of murder based on the testimony
and recording of the complainant's conversation with a police informant placed
inside the complainant's cell. Id. at 2. The ECHR held that use of this evidence at
trial violated the complainant's right to silence since the evidence suggested the
statements were coerced. Id. at 2, 15. However, the ECHR held that the use of the
evidence at trial did not violate the complainant's right to a fair trial since the State
courts thoroughly considered the admissibility of the evidence and decided it had
probative value and was not completely unreliable. Id. at 14.
106. See European Convention, supra note 4, art. 6 (according individuals the
right to examine witnesses against them in criminal proceedings); see also A,
381-82 (conceding that in other proceedings in the United
[2004] EWCA Civ.
Kingdom, third party statements are inadmissible if considered hearsay); Engel &
Others v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1976) (recognizing the
ECHR has held that a criminal charge has an "autonomous" meaning that does not
necessarily depend on a State's labeling of the offense); FRANCIS G. JACOBS &
ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 142 (3d ed.

2002) (noting this independent approach allows the ECHR to look at the substance
of State action and prevent Member States from avoiding their obligations under
the European Convention by classifying a criminal charge under the guise of a
different offense).
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apply since the United Kingdom is not responsible for the absence of
the witnesses, who remain in the custody of the United States.10 7
In order to convince the ECHR to allow an exception to the Right
of Confrontation, the United Kingdom would have to convince the
ECHR that the Appeals Commission proceedings sufficiently
protected the detainees' rights despite the detainees' inability to
examine the witnesses.108 In this respect, the anonymity of the
witnesses works against the United Kingdom's argument, since as
Kostovski showed, the ECHR does not look kindly upon the use of
anonymous witness statements.10 9 In addition, the fact that the
Appeals Commission relied on the anonymous statements to a
decisive extent in its decisions11 0 is likely to be an important factor
for the ECHR, which repeatedly has held that questionable evidence
should not form the basis for a court's judgment."I
Moreover, the proceedings for the detainees are even more
disturbing than the proceeding in Kostovski, where the State courts at
the very least allowed the defendant to submit a list of questions for
1 2 The United Kingdom did not give
the court to ask the witnesses."

107. See Ferrantelli v. Italy, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, 950-51 (upholding the
fairness of the proceedings despite Italy's use of hearsay evidence obtained after
the witness' death because Italy had no part in causing the deaths of the witness).
108. See Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-22 (1989)
(ruling that the absence and anonymity of the witnesses handicapped the
complainants' defense and resulted in an unfair trial for the complainants).
109. See id. at 20 (reasoning that the anonymity of a witness prohibits the
opposing counsel from demonstrating the witness' unreliability, prejudice, or
hostility). The ECHR also noted that the absence of the witness precludes the court
from observing the witness' demeanor during questioning, thus depriving the court
the opportunity to form its own impression of the witness' reliability. Id.
110. See, e.g., E v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2003] UKSIAC 4/2002,
10, available at http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgments/siac/outcomes/
Sc42002E.htm (holding that "the material which drives us to [our] conclusion is
mainly closed"); G v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2003] UKSIAC 2/2002,
6, 15 (conceding that the main evidence consisted of closed material that
confirmed the decision for the detainees' continued imprisonment).
111. See, e.g., Kostovski, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (finding that the use of
anonymous witnesses and the court's substantial reliance on their testimony
resulted in an unfair trial for the defendant).
112. Id. at2O.
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the detainees a similar right, nor did it provide an alternative.' 13 In
sum, there is little to suggest that the United Kingdom adequately
protected the detainees' interests in the absence of allowing
confrontation with witnesses, and the ECHR is not likely to find the
proceedings fair under the circumstances.
3. The Dubious Circumstancesof the Third Party Statements
Cast Doubt on Whether the Statements Were
Voluntary, Reliable, and Accurate
The ECHR would likely be troubled by the evidence that suggests
the United Kingdom is using statements allegedly obtained by the
United States through torture of U.S. detainees in Cuba and
Afghanistan." 4 If U.S. authorities obtained the evidence against the
detainees through the use of torture, as the detainees claim, the use of
such evidence seriously undermines the fairness of the proceedings
due to the unreliability of the evidence." 5
Ample evidence demonstrates that torture can yield false
statements. 16 The tortured are anxious to end their suffering and the
113. But cf Edward Alden et al., Legal Cases in Germany and the United States
Show How Authorities with Interests that Often Diverge Are Inching Towards
Greater Co-operation in Prosecuting Suspects, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at 19
(reporting that the United States complied with Germany's request for evidence
from the U.S. detainees after defense lawyers for suspected terrorists in Germany
pressed the courts to exclude statements made by the detainees).
114. See Cohen, supra note 50 (reporting that a secret service agent admitted
that Britain's secret intelligence agency uses statements obtained under torture);
see also Andrew Woodcock, U.K. Diplomat Condemns 'Torture-Induced
Intelligence,' PRESS ASS'N, Oct. 11, 2004 (arguing that information obtained
through torture is normally unreliable and thus unfair).
115. See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text (explaining that evidence
obtained under torture is inherently unreliable and often inaccurate).
116. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 249 (2002)
(recounting a case in which Philippine authorities used torture to induce a prisoner
into confessing even though no one believed he was guilty); In re Application of
the United States for Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 357-60
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the case of an Eqyptian national that involved a
torture-induced confession). The F.B.I. detained the Egyptian as a material witness
after a security guard found a copy of the Qur'an and a transmitter capable of
being used for air-to-ground communication in his room. Id. at 358. During
interrogations Higazy falsely confessed to owning the transmitter. Id. at 360. The
F.B.I. later discovered that the security guard had repeatedly lied to them, and an
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torturers are usually very suggestive of the admissions they desire to
hear." 7 The potential for torture-induced evidence in the detainees'
case expounds the false statement problem because the statements
purportedly come from third parties, and accusatory statements of
others do not involve the same counter-intuitiveness and selfdestructiveness a tortured person copes with when making a
confession.118 In addition, the third party statements allegedly
obtained under torture are inherently more unfair to the detainees
than self-incriminating statements obtained under torture, where the
detainees could at least testify about the circumstances of the
interrogation."1 9
Ferrantellisuggests that the ECHR would require the detainees to
present evidence that indicates something more than suspicious
circumstances suggesting U.S. authorities induced the third party
statements under torture. 120 The detainees should be able to meet this
standard, considering that even the Court of Appeal found that a
"serious issue" existed regarding the presence of torture after it
considered the various accounts of former detainees and military
officials, as well as the exposure of government documents implying

American pilot staying in the same hotel was the actual owner of the transmitter.
Id. at 359.
117. See, e.g., SHAFIQ RASUL ET AL., supra note 81,

185-200 (noting an

interrogator persistently insisted the detainee should admit to being in a video that
took place in Afghanistan even though the detainee was working and attending
college in England at that time). Shafiq claims the guards isolated, short shackled,
and interrogated him for long periods of time for five to six weeks before he finally
relented. Id. 199. He stated, "I was going out of my mind and didn't know what
was going on. I was desperate for it to end and therefore eventually I just gave in
and admitted to being in the video." Id.
118. See James R. Agar, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert
Testimony, 1999 ARMY LAW. 26, 27 (explaining the false confession theory that
suspects usually do not offer spontaneous confessions because self-condemnation
is abnormal).
119. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1123, 66
(Neuberger, L.J., dissenting).
120. See Ferrantelli v. Italy, 1996-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, 943-51 (noting that the
suspicious death of the witness in Ferrantelli,when balanced with the ECHR's
conclusion that the State was not responsible for the witness' death, was
insufficient to show unreliability).
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U.S. approval of torture that indicate a use of torture in U.S.
1 21
tactics.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom's decision against using
confessions obtained at Guantanamo Bay against four British men
whom the United States recently released to U.K. custody is also
likely to sway the ECHR into believing that there is good cause to
suspect that the evidence is torture-induced. 22 The United
Kingdom's acknowledgment
that statements obtained in
Guantanamo Bay would be inadmissible in a British court evidences
the potential unreliability and involuntariness of such statements, and
the ECHR is not likely to allow the United Kingdom to use evidence
that it acknowledges itself is questionable merely because the
123
detainees are processed under the guise of a civil proceeding.
4. The Courtof Appeal Improperly Held that Weighing the
Evidence Sufficiently Protectedthe Detainees' Rights
The Court of Appeal erroneously failed to recognize that the
European Convention's provision for a fair trial requires that the
United Kingdom establish better safeguards to allow the detainees a
fair trial in light of the secrecy and questionable nature of the
evidence. Although the U.K. method of weighing the evidence might
have alleviated some of the unfairness, the approach was unlikely to
dispel the prejudicial effect of the evidence and the tendency of fact121. See A, [2004] EWCA Civ. 122 (noting that the detainees submitted more
than four volumes of material on the evidence of torture); discussion supra Part I.C
(detailing personal accounts of detainees' lives inside Guantanamo Bay and
discussing the Department of Justice memorandum that interpreted torture as
justifiable under international law).
122. See Jason Bennetto et al., Guantanamo Britons Return: Police ChiefRules
Out Prosecutions that Rely on Guantanamo Evidence, INDEP. (London), Jan. 26,
2005, at 4 (reporting that the police commissioner said the prosecution would
either have to obtain a confession from the four men or find additional evidence
before the case could be tried).
123. See id. (discussing the disparate treatment by the United Kingdom of the
recently released Guantanamo Bay detainees as compared with the treatment of the
U.K. detainees). The police will likely release the previously held Guantanamo
Bay detainees if there is insufficient evidence to charge them with a crime while
the U.K. detainees continue to be detained without a trial. Id. The Commissioner
added that he did not favor trying the released prisoners under the Anti-terrorism
Act in an attempt to detain them without a trial. Id.
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finders to overvalue negative facts. 124 Moreover, the decision by the
United Kingdom not to use evidence obtained in Guantanamo Bay
against recently released U.S. detainees demonstrates that the
1 25
evidence has little probative value.
In addition, the Court of Appeal should have acknowledged that
the United Kingdom's low burden of proving a reasonable suspicion
or belief makes the prohibition of potential torture-induced evidence
even more imperative.126 Although the Home Secretary has six
months to gather legitimate evidence to meet this low standard of
proof,127 the decisions of the Appeals Commission show that the
Commission repeatedly relied on closed evidence to substantiate the
detainees' continued imprisonment. 28 Given the low standard of
proof, this is hardly understandable, and it suggests that instead of
actively pursuing the investigations into the detainees, the Home
Secretary chose to rely on the closed evidence as a convenient means
of keeping the detainees imprisoned. 29 By allowing the Appeals

124. See Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence:
Having Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31
UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1045-48 (1984) (demonstrating that people are more likely to
give credence to negative evidence than positive evidence of the same magnitude
which may lead to incorrect results).
125. See Bennetto et al., supra note 122 (quoting the police commissioner as
saying that the evidence obtained in Guantanamo Bay would be absolutely
inadmissible in a British court due to the torturous methods by which it was
obtained).
126. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 25 (requiring the
Home Secretary to prove that there are reasonable grounds for believing or
suspecting the detainee is involved in terrorist activities); Audrey Gillan, No Right
to Trial for 10 Terror Suspects: Men Can Be Detained Indefinitely, Judges Rule,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 30, 2002, at 6 ("The shockingly low burden of proof... violates
the right to the presumption of innocence.").
127. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, § 26 (encouraging the State to
gather evidence "as soon as is reasonably practicable").
128. See, e.g., supra note 110 (providing examples where the Appeals
Commission relied on closed evidence to a decisive extent); A v. Sec'y of State for
the Home Dep't, [2003] UKSIAC 1/2002/2, 27 (mentioning that the decision to
continue the detainees' imprisonment can only be properly sustained by analyzing
closed evidence).
129. See Bright, supra note 50 (reporting that until recently no British official
attempted to interrogate any of the detainees regarding their alleged involvement
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Commission to continue to weigh the evidence rather than excluding
it from the proceedings, the Court of Appeal essentially encouraged
the Home Secretary to carry on "sloppy practices" without regard to
the effect such evidence has on the detainees' rights.13 ° Accordingly,
the Court of Appeal's reliance on the method of weighing the
evidence is mistaken since it failed to adequately protect the
detainees' right to a fair trial set forth under Article 6 of the
European Convention.
B. THE ECHR MAY INTERPRET ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION AS REQUIRING THE EXCLUSION OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER TORTURE

The opinion in Soering v. United Kingdom indicated that the
ECHR may apply Article 3 extraterritorially when a State's actions
are causally linked to torture in another country.' Therefore, if the
ECHR determines that the European Convention's ban on torture
includes a ban on evidence obtained under torture, the ECHR could
find the United Kingdom liable for a violation of Article 3.132
Moreover, by following the reasoning set forth in Soering, the ECHR
may require the United Kingdom to investigate the circumstances of
the evidence.' 33 This holds true regardless of any reasons the United

Kingdom may proffer for using the evidence.' 34
with terrorist organizations). After the press criticized the Home Office for its lack
of questioning, the Home Secretary mailed letters to the detainees requesting to
discuss any intelligence the detainees may possess. Id.
130. See Use of Secret Evidence, supra note 102 (evaluating the use of secret
evidence in the Immigration and Naturalization Service proceedings in the United
States and declaring that the lack of an adversarial challenge in the evidence
encourages the government to rely on substandard evidence considered "innuendo
and rumor").
131. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1989)
(enforcing Article 3 obligations when a State's extradition of an individual risks
acts of torture or ill-treatment).
132. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (explaining how the use of torture-induced
evidence is causally related to the practice of torture).
133. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 88 (stating that the European
Convention's ban on torture does not allow for exceptions and places liability on a
State for actions that risk foreseeable violations of Article 3).
134. See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (noting that the ECHR has explicitly stated
that the fight against terrorism was not a reason for avoiding Article 3 obligations).
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1. The ECHR May Find that the European Convention 's
Ban on Torture Implicitly Prohibits the Use of
Evidence Obtained Under Torture
The ECHR could interpret the European Convention's ban on
torture as implicitly prohibiting the use of evidence obtained under
torture. In interpreting such an implicit obligation under Article 3,
the ECHR may refer to the Convention Against Torture, which
explicitly prohibits States from using statements made as a result of
torture in any proceeding. 35 By following the reasoning of the
drafters of the Convention Against Torture, the ECHR would
recognize that the admission of torture-induced evidence in a
proceeding provides an important motive for the continued use of
torture. 136 Through such analysis, the ECHR could hold that the
United Kingdom's actions are causally linked to the occurrence of
torture and hold the United Kingdom responsible for a violation of
Article 3.37
Such a finding is probable, especially in light of the ECHR's
willingness to refer to the Convention Against Torture for issues
involving torture.13 s In Soering the ECHR implied that Article 3
contains some implicit responsibilities that are laid out in detail in
the provisions of the Convention Against Torture. 13 9 Thus, just as the
135. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 74, art. 15.
136. See id.; see also J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT 148 (1988) (expressing the view that torture is usually aimed at

acquiring evidence for prosecution and relating the drafters' hopes that prohibiting
evidence obtained under torture could prevent torture from occurring).
137. See RAZA HUSAIN, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE ECHR 3 (2002)

(theorizing that the ECHR will apply extraterritorial obligations under Article 3
when a State's act "causes consequences which are sufficiently serious and
direct").
138. See, e.g., Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (tuming to the
Convention Against Torture for guidance on whether to impose extraterritorial
responsibility for extraditing an individual when there are grounds for believing
the extradition would put the individual at risk of torture).
139. See id. at 35 ("The fact that a specialized treaty should spell out in detail a
specific obligation attaching to the prohibition of torture does not mean that an
essentially similar obligation is not already inherent in the general terms of Article
Three of the European Convention.").
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ECHR adopted the Convention Against Torture's prohibition against
extraditing a person when there is a danger of torture involved, so
too may the ECHR adopt the Convention Against Torture's
prohibition against using evidence obtained under torture. 4
In addition to the Convention Against Torture, various other
international treaties engage the responsibility of a State that uses
evidence obtained under torture.' 4 ' The ECHR's leadership role
among international judicial courts, coupled with its strong
that the ECHR would
condemnation of torture, makes it probable
42
well.1
as
responsibility
a
recognize such
2. The ECHR May EstablishExtraterritorialObligationson States
Intending to Use Evidence Obtained Under Torture
Assuming the ECHR establishes a causal link between torture and
the use of evidence obtained under torture, the question remains
whether the ECHR would engage the responsibility of the United
Kingdom to investigate and disprove claims of torture involving the
evidence. It is possible that the ECHR would require the State to
investigate claims of torture before using questionable evidence in a
proceeding, just as the ECHR required the United Kingdom in
Soering to assess conditions in a foreign State before extraditing a
criminal.'43 Because the ECHR already obligates a State to
investigate arguable claims of torture, it is sensible that the ECHR
could create a similar obligation for arguable claims of torture-

140. See id.
141. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, art. 7, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966) (prohibiting the use or admissibility of statements or confessions obtained
through torture in judicial proceedings); Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art. 69, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (declaring that "[e]vidence
obtained by means of a violation of this statute or internationally recognized
human rights" is inadmissible).
142. See generally Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 413, 414 (1996) (affirming unequivocally that protection against torture is
absolute under the European Convention).
143. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (enforcing the obligation to
examine conditions in foreign States despite the United Kingdom's argument that
such examination incurs serious hardship).
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induced evidence.' 44 The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and even the United Kingdom's own domestic
law creates such an obligation and places the burden on the
prosecution to prove that statements introduced as evidence are
voluntarily made. 4 5 The ECHR may follow these readily established
examples and likewise place the burden on the United Kingdom to
prove the voluntariness of evidence, provided that it is the party that
4
seeks to rely on the evidence.

6

3. The Importance ofArticle 3 Will Likely Override Any Interests the
State May Have in Creatingan Exception to Article 3
If the ECHR imposes an extraterritorial obligation upon the State
to investigate the circumstances of the evidence, it will probably not
accept any reasons the United Kingdom may proffer for allowing an
exception to this obligation. It is probable that the United Kingdom
would reiterate the argument it made to the Court of Appeal,
claiming that the serious threat of terrorism justifies the use of the
evidence without further investigation into the methods used to
obtain it. 147 In particular, the United Kingdom may argue that there

exists a strong interest in using any available evidence to detain

144. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing the ECHR

precedent that places the burden on the State to investigate a complainant's
arguable claim of torture).
145. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on Zdravko
Mucic's Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, 42 (Sept. 25, 1997), available at
the
(placing
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/70925EV2.htm
burden on the prosecution to prove convincingly and beyond a reasonable doubt
that authorities obtained the evidence without using oppressive conduct); see also
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76 (Eng.) (obligating the
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that confessions are voluntary).
146. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1123,
513 (Neuberger, LJ., dissenting) (arguing that because the Home Secretary is
adducing the evidence, he is more likely to know of the circumstances under which
authorities obtained the evidence).
147. See id. 126 (recounting the U.K. argument that U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1373 supports the view that the government should "cast its net wide in
2, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
obtaining information"); see also S.C. Res. 1373,
S/RES/1377 (Sept. 28, 2001) (declaring that terrorism is a challenge for all States
and requiring States to cooperate and provide assistance in the fight against
terrorism).

312

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[21:277

suspected terrorists due to the difficulty States face in gathering
48
evidence and prosecuting terrorists under the normal rules of law. 1
Yet the ECHR is not likely to accept such an argument, especially
since the ECHR has explicitly stated that it will not allow Article 3
exceptions to combat terrorism. 49 Consequently, although the United
Kingdom is likely to name some very strong reasons against
requiring it to investigate the circumstances of the evidence, it is
probable that the ECHR would find that the importance of Article 3
supercedes any public interest the United Kingdom presents. 50

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE ECHR SHOULD CONTINUE ITS STRONG STANCE AGAINST
TORTURE BY PROHIBITING THE USE OF TORTUREINDUCED EVIDENCE IN PROCEEDINGS

The absolute prohibition of torture adopted by the European
Convention, along with the European Convention's "special
character as a human rights treaty"'' strongly suggest that the ECHR
should interpret the European Convention as prohibiting the use of
statements obtained under torture.' 52 The use of torture-induced
evidence in legal proceedings essentially legitimizes the methods
148. See A, [2004] EWCA Civ. 373 (noting that the U.K. legislature passed
Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism Act to address the problems of obtaining sufficient
evidence to criminally convict suspected terrorists under the normal rule of law);
see also Sireesha Chenumolu, Revamping InternationalSecurities Laws to Break
the FinancialInfrastructureof Global Terrorism, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 385,
412-13 (2003) (discussing the problems that arise in using financial information to
track and prosecute terrorists).
149. See Indelicato v. Italy, App. No. 31143/96, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 30
(West 2002) (holding that the European Convention does not tolerate torture under
any circumstances, even in the fight against terrorism or in an emergency that
threatens the life of the nation).
150. See id.
151. See Al Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep.
11, 55 (2002) (stressing the nature of the European Convention and emphasized
that the European Convention should not be construed without regard to other rules
of international law).
152. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1989)
(proclaiming that in interpreting the European Convention, the ECHR must regard
the goal of enforcing human rights and freedoms).
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used to obtain the evidence.1 53 In order for the ECHR to continue its
strong stance against torture, the ECHR needs to follow the same
principle recently set by the Israeli Supreme Court that a "democracy
must often fight with one hand tied behind its back. ' 154 The ECHR
should refer to the Convention Against Torture as authority for
recognizing that the use of evidence obtained under torture is
abhorrently linked to the practice of torture, and it should disavow
any approach that does not prohibit the evidence from the
courtroom.

155

B. A BURDEN SHIFTING ANALYSIS BEST PROTECTS THE
INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

If the ECHR determines that a statement obtained under torture is
inadmissible, it will then have to determine whether the detainees or
the United Kingdom should prove the existence or nonexistence of
15 6
torture, and what should be the standard for this burden of proof.
The ECHR should establish a burden shifting analysis whereby the
detainees must first establish an arguable claim that authorities
obtained the evidence through torture. 57 In response, the State must
153. See Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted?PragmaticAbsolutism
and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1507-09 (2004) (outlining the
slippery slope argument for the ban on torture). "'[O]nce legitimated, torture could
develop a constituency with a vested interest in perpetuating it."' Id. at 1508 n. 100
(quoting John H. Langbein, The History of Torture, in TORTURE (Sanford Levison
ed., 2004)).
154. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Againt Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999],
39,
available
at
http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/doc/torture.html
(refusing to justify torture by Israeli intelligence despite the problem of terrorism
in Israel, regarding the matter as one for the legislature).
155. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1 (explaining the view that a State's use of
the products of torture ultimately encourages the continued practice of torture).
156. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1123,
291 (Neuberger, L.J., dissenting) (discussing the need to determine whether the
burden of proof of torture should fall on the detainees or the United Kingdom).
Since the other two justices in the Court of Appeal held that weighing the evidence
sufficiently protected the fairness of the proceedings, the justices did not address
the issue of on whom the burden would lie to prove the use or nonuse of torture.
Id. T 258-59.
157. See Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3264, T 102 (obligating
States to investigate and dispel an arguable claim of torture when an individual
claims torture by the State authorities).
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prove by a balance of the probabilities the nonexistence of torture in
1 58
the procurement of the evidence.

This burden shifting analysis takes into account the disadvantages
both the United Kingdom and the detainees face in evaluating and
proving the conditions of the U.S. interrogations. The arguable claim
standard may allow the detainees to meet their burden through
circumstantial evidence, making the survival of their claim possible
even in light of the little knowledge the detainees have on the
evidence against them. 59 A higher standard, on the other hand, could
easily preclude the detainees from bringing forth a valid claim due to
the impossibility of working with the closed evidence.1 6° For
instance, without knowing the identity of the third parties, the
detainees would have to prove their case by setting forth evidence
showing a generalized claim that the United States systemically uses
torture in the War on Terror.161 But without at the very least knowing
the identity of the third party, the detainees could not prove that the
United States tortured the actual third party who made the
statement. 62 Additionally, the detainees face the challenge of
demonstrating their claim in light of the Bush administration's
refusal to allow U.N. inspectors or the media access to holding
facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and other countries allied

158. See Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of
Standards of Proof,50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 251, 257, 261 (2002) (defining the

balance of the probabilities as a "more likely than not" test).
159. See A, [2004] EWCA Civ.

128-29, 138 (discussing the circumstantial

evidence of inhuman conditions at Guantanamo Bay and rejecting the
complainant's claim, as it did not prove that the evidence had actually been
procured through torture).
160. See id.; Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules,

2003, S.I. 2003/1034, § 4(1) (denying the detainees access to evidence when the
Appeals Commission believes the evidence could pose a risk to national security).
161. See, e.g., UNCAT Communication, supra note 74,
3.5.4-3.5.13, 6.4
(assessing the various reports of international organizations the complainant
produced in an attempt to set forth his charge before the Committee Against
Torture that France used torture-induced evidence in his extradition proceeding).
162. See Josh Meyer, Court Upholds Terrorism Law Secrecy, L.A.

TIMES,

Jan.

1, 2003 (quoting an attorney for an Islamic charity accused of supporting terrorism
as saying that the U.S. government's use of secret evidence against the charity has
him "working in the dark").
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with the United States.163 Similarly, the arguable claim standard
recognizes the difficult task the detainees face in demonstrating the
presence of torture through news reports and eyewitness statements
of other detainees and unnamed government officials whose
credibility may be questionable. '6'
Nevertheless,

the arguable claim

standard assures that the

detainees must satisfy a meaningful

standard by introducing

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that their claim has merit. 165 For
example, the ECHR may require the detainees to present evidence
from a variety of sources and reference reports from well-respected

163. See

REPORTERS

COMM.

FOR

FREEDOM

OF

THE

PRESS,

HOMEFRONT

CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION
AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 8
(Sept. 2002), available at

http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconfidential;
see also Colum Lynch, U.N.
Investigators Appeal to U.S.: Human Rights Workers Seeking Access to Detention
Centers, WASH. POST, June 26, 2004, at A17 (reporting that human rights
investigators appealed to the United States for permission to send specialists
"trained to check for evidence of torture, arbitrary detention, medical and physical
abuse, and judicial independence" to detention centers in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay,
and Afghanistan). The revelations of torture in Iraq brought renewed demands that
President Bush rescind his refusal to allow U.N. inspectors to examine the
conditions of its prisons. See Joan McAlpine, Sorry About the Torture, But Cruel
Interrogation Goes On, HERALD (Glasgow), May 6, 2004, at 16 (averring that in
addition to refusing U.N. inspectors access to the prison in Guantanamo Bay, the
administration also tried to undermine the Convention Against Torture by refusing
to help finance it). However, the Bush administration argues that such secrecy is
necessary to prevent al-Qaeda from developing counter-techniques to prevent the
gathering of intelligence. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the
U.S. Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the War on
Terror?, 92 Ky. L.J. 849, 873-81 (2003) (providing a thorough background of the
torture allegations and theorizing on interrogators' techniques and reasons for
secrecy regarding the methods used).
164. See Addicott, supra note 163, at 895 (arguing that it is to be expected that
detainees would allege that their captors tortured them, pointing out testimonials
from other detainees who proclaim that the United States treated them well at
Guantanamo Bay).
165. See Nahigian v. Leonard, 233 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (D. Mass. 2002)
(suggesting that an arguable claim is equivalent to a colorable claim, and
explaining that an arguable claim should be seemingly valid and not frivolous); see
also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (defining a frivolous claim as a
claim in which "[none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits" (quoting
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967))).
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organizations. 166 The requirement for such evidence demonstrates
that the detainees must show that substantial grounds exist for
believing the United Kingdom is using evidence induced from
torture by U.S. officials, while at the same time realizing the limited
167
nature of the evidence available to the detainees.
Likewise, the balance of probabilities standard appropriately
considers the difficulties the United Kingdom would face in
examining the interrogation methods used by U.S. intelligence
officials. 68 By challenging the United Kingdom to meet the balance
of probabilities standard, the United Kingdom Would have to show
that the majority of the evidence favored the non-existence of
torture.169 While this is a significant hurdle, it is not as stringent as
the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, where the
United Kingdom would face the almost impossible task of proving
the nonexistence of torture to a virtual certainty. 17° Thus, both
standards require the parties to meet meaningful but attainable
burdens of proof.
There are several reasons for placing the ultimate burden on the
State. First, by placing the initial burden on the detainees, the
analysis ensures that the United Kingdom does not need to act on a
frivolous claim.' 7' Next, because the United Kingdom is the party
166. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al (revealing a confidential Red Cross report that
found that the U.S. military was engaging in tactics "tantamount to torture" on
Guantanamo Bay prisoners).
167. See Comm. of Ministers Recommendation, supra note 43 (explaining that
whether substantial grounds exist for an alleged breach of the European
Convention is often a factor in setting forth an arguable claim).
168. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1989)
(expressing the view of the United Kingdom that it would face grave difficulties in
conducting investigations into the affairs of another State).
169. See Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 158, at 257 (noting that the balance of
probabilities standard is the equivalent of the preponderance of the evidence
standard).
170. See id. at 252 (noting that the balance of probabilities standard may be the
best standard for situations where many of the facts are unknown).
171. See text accompanying note 43 (explaining that the ECHR has not defined
the term "arguable claim," and that it is generally defined on a case-by-case basis,
but is most often referred to as a claim that has substantial grounds for alleging a
breach of the Convention).

2005]

EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER TORTURE

317

wishing to use the evidence, it is appropriate that the United
172
Kingdom prove its veracity.
Finally, the United Kingdom stands a much better chance than the
detainees in obtaining further details on the circumstances of the
evidence from the United States. 73 For instance, theUnited States is
likely to respond to U.K. demands for further inquiry if it feels that a
refusal to do so would jeopardize the prosecution against the
detainees. This exact scenario occurred when the United States
complied with Germany's request for information after German
courts threatened to acquit a suspected terrorist due to the uncertainty
of the evidence the United States provided. 174 This high-profile
dispute demonstrates that the United Kingdom has the power to
obtain further information regarding the evidence against the
detainees, and thus should be the party that bears the ultimate burden
of proof.
C. THE U.K. PARLIAMENT SHOULD ENJOIN THE INDEFINITE
USE OF CLOSED EVIDENCE BY THE HOME SECRETARY

The U.K. Parliament must not allow the Home Secretary to rely on
closed evidence indefinitely as a means of imprisoning the detainees.
As the United Kingdom considers amending the Anti-terrorism Act
to make it compliant with the European Convention, Parliament must
172. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on Zdravko
Mucic's Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, 42 (Sept. 25, 1997), availableat
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/70925EV2.htm
(placing the
burden on the prosecution to prove that statements the prosecution introduces as
evidence are voluntarily made).
173. See GlobalSecurity.org, GuantanamoBay, Camp X-ray, http://www.global
security.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay-x-ray.htm (last visited Dec. 12,
2005) (noting that in an effort to mollify claims of mistreatment, the United States
allowed the British government to visit the prison).
174. See Alden et al., supra note 113 (revealing that Germany successfully used
the threat of acquittal as a means of acquiring information on the interrogation of a
third party witness in U.S. custody). The dispute arose when a German court
acquitted a suspected terrorist after the United States refused a request from
Germany to allow the witness, who was a U.S. detainee, to testify at trial. Id.
Several months after this initial dispute, another suspected terrorist challenged the
evidence against him. Id. Germany once again requested information from the
United States regarding the circumstances of the interrogation, and this time the
United States complied, responding to Germany's twenty-seven page request and
providing detailed accounts of the interrogation. Id.
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keep in mind the commitment the United Kingdom made in the
European Convention to guarantee all persons the right to a fair
trial. 175 Parliament should interpret a fair trial to mean a trial in which
the adversarial process applies to all meaningful aspects, including
the right to challenge evidence. 176 An imminent threat to the security
of the nation may justify the temporary detention of an individual,
but it does not justify prolonged detention of the individual without
charge or trial. 7 7 Parliament should establish a reasonable time frame
in which the use of closed evidence ceases so that the Home
Secretary must carry out investigations that produce more reliable
evidence and assist in the truth-finding process. 178 The United
Kingdom, home to the Magna Carta, should not be a nation
dependent upon secret evidence as a means of indefinite
79
imprisonment.

CONCLUSION
Since September 11, 2001, democratic nations have been asking
their citizens to surrender certain liberties for the sake of national
security. 180 The United Kingdom provides the latest example of this
relinquishment of liberties by accepting without question evidence
provided by the United States, despite increasing indicia that the

175. See European Convention, supra note 4, art. 6(1) (guarantying persons the
right to a fair trial and enumerating basic minimum rights inherent in a fair trial).
176. See Jasper v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 441, 51 (2000) (noting
that a fundamental aspect of a fair trial is the right to have knowledge of, and the
ability to defend against, the evidence adduced by the State).
177. See U.K. CourtBlasts Detention Without Charge, RECORD (Ontario), Dec.
17, 2004, at A5 (quoting a Law Lord as stating that a statute permitting indefinite
detention without trial is contrary to the history of the United Kingdom).
178. See Use of Secret Evidence, supra note 102 (criticizing the use of closed
evidence as interfering with the ultimate goal of reaching the truth and noting that
closed evidence encourages cynicism of the legal process).
179. See Bartleby.com, Magna Carta, http://www.bartleby.com/65/ma/
MagnaCar.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2005) (relaying the history of the Magna
Carta and its status as being a beacon of liberty).
180. See Hoge, supra note 1 (mentioning some of the various nations that
enacted legislation circumventing civil liberties in response to the September 11
attacks on the United States).
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United States uses torture in its fight against terrorism. 8 ' As a
protector of human rights and civil liberties, the ECHR must provide
guidance to the nations bound together by the European Convention
as these nations struggle to remain steadfast to democratic ideals in
the age of terrorism.182 Therefore, it is essential that the ECHR
admonish the use of torture-induced evidence should it consider the
case of the British detainees.'83

POSTSCRIPT
Since acceptance of this Comment for publication in January
2005, several important events occurred that affect how democratic
nations and international courts are handling possible torture-induced
evidence in trials against suspected terrorists. Most importantly for
purposes of this Comment, the House of Lords ruled on the
detainees' appeal on December 8, 2005, and admonished the use of
84
evidence obtained under torture in judicial proceedings.
A. THE DECISION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS

The House of Lords unanimously overturned the Court of Appeal
by holding that the United Kingdom may not use evidence that a
foreign State has procured through torture in a judicial proceeding
against a suspected terrorist.'8 5 However, the Law Lords disagreed as

to what should be the standard for determining whether the foreign
State used torture in obtaining the evidence. Lord Bingham
suggested that, where the detainee brings forth "some plausible
181. See discussion supra Part I.E (providing an overview of some of the
evidence implying the United States uses torture for interrogation).
182. See discussion supra Part L.A (explaining how the European Convention is
heralded as a successful human rights treaty).
183. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that torture-induced evidence
should be prohibited from the proceedings of the Appeals Commission).
184. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2005] UKHL 71.
185. Id.
1 (restating the arguments by the Home Secretary and by the
detainees, and holding that torture-induced evidence may not be admitted in an
Appeals Commission hearing, even where the United Kingdom did not partake in
the torture); see also id. 33 (relying on ECHR case law to find that Soering
created an extraterritorial responsibility for States to implement measures that
would prevent torture by other States).
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reason" for why the evidence .may be torture-induced, the Appeals
Commission should direct an investigation that would enable it to
make an informed judgment as to whether there was a "real risk" that
the evidence was obtained under torture . 186 Lord Bingham felt that if
the Appeals Commission is unable to conclude that there was a real
risk that the foreign State procured the evidence through torture, it
should disallow the evidence from the proceedings. 87 Lord Hope, on
the other hand, recommended a standard that would shift the.onerous
burden of proving torture to the detainee, so that the Appeals
Commission would admit evidence where the detainees could not
establish that there was a real risk that the evidence, was tortureinduced. 88 The Law Lords decided in a four to three split in favor of
Lord Hope's standard.'8
.
B. NEW DEVELOPMENTS INTHE UNITED KINGDOM
In addition to the ruling by the House of Lords on the detainees'
case, the United Kingdom experienced some important changes to its
anti-terrorism laws and policies since this Comment was accepted for
publication. While these changes did not affect the detainees'. case,
they are nonetheless important to the issues brought forth in this
Comment.
1. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
On March 14, 2005, Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism Act expired.1 90 In
a last-minute vote, Parliament approved sweeping changes to the
186. Id. 54-56 (noting the potential for unfairness in applying a conventional
approach to atypical cases in which defendants are normally prevented from
having access to the evidence against them).
187. Id.
188. Id. 118 (using as a guide Article 15 of the Convention Against Torture,
which Lord Hope interpreted to require the "establishment" of torture by the party
requesting the exclusion of the evidence). Lord Hope wrote to make clear in his
opinion that he believed his standard and that of Lord Bingham's differed only
where the Appeals Commission has balanced the probabilities and is unable to
conclude that torture occurred during procurement of the evidence. Id.
189. Id.
54-57. The decision was split with. Lords Nicholls and Hoffman
agreeing with Lord Binghman's approach, and Lords Rodger, Carswell, and
Brown supporting Lord Hope's. approach. Id. 80, 99, 145, 158, 172.
190. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 16 (Eng.).
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United Kingdom's anti-terrorism legislation, resulting in the passage
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.191 Unlike the Anti-terrorism
Act, the- Prevention of Terrorism Act does not allow the Home
Secretary to detain individuals indefinitely without charge. 192 Instead,
the Prevention of Terrorism Act sustains the extensive powers of the
executive through the use of "control orders," which allow the Home
Secretary to enforce "any" imposition on an individual's liberty that
the Home Secretary believes is necessary to limit suspected terrorist
activities. 193

The control orders endeavor to impose a more proportional
approach than indefinite detention and also attempt to prevent the
discriminatory provisions that the House of Lords found in the AntiTerrorism Act. 194 However, the Prevention of Terrorism Act did
nothing to alter the use of torture-induced evidence, which arose

191. Id.; see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED KINGDOM
8 (2005), available at http://www.publications.
PARLIAMENT, NINTH REPORT
parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/61/6102.htm (declaring that Parliament
was rushing through passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill without
appropriate scrutiny, despite the fact that the legislation bestows unprecedented
powers on the executive). The Committee recommended that the Government
restrict the Prevention of Terrorism Bill to the current detainees until Parliament
had a proper opportunity to examine and debate the new legislation. Id.
192. Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 1 (giving the Home Secretary the power to
impose control orders on persons suspected of terrorism). The Act favors
prosecution of individuals over the imposition of control orders, so long as there is
evidence available for prosecution. Id. § 8(2). But see infra notes 211-212 and
accompanying text (explaining that new legislation may once again allow for
prolonged detention of individuals suspected of terrorism before officials file
charges against the suspects).
193. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 1(3) ("The obligations that may be
imposed by a control order made against an individual are any obligations that the
Secretary of State... considers necessary." (emphasis added)). The Prevention of
Terrorism Act lists some of the possible impositions as prohibiting the individual's
association with certain persons, restricting the individual's movements, requiring
the individual to comply with searches and seizures of the individual's property
without court-obtained warrants, and monitoring of the individual through
electronic tags. Id. § 1(4).
194. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, 43
(criticizing the method of relying on immigration laws as a means of resolving
national security problems and for ignoring the potential danger that may arise
from U.K. citizens).
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from the permissive procedural rules of the Appeals Commission. 95
Thus, had the House of Lords not ruled in the detainees' favor, the
use of possible torture-induced evidence in certain proceedings
against persons suspected of terrorism may have continued.
2. Roberts v. Parole Board
Though not addressed in the detainees' case, the House of Lords
recently reaffirmed the use of the procedures set forth for dealing
with closed evidence in Roberts v. ParoleBoard,'9 6 in which the Law
Lords approved of the closed evidence procedures in the context of
parole hearings.' 97 The House of Lords allowed the closed evidence
procedures to expand beyond the confines of national security
interests, 98 and found that its use was consistent with the rights
afforded under the European Convention. 99
C. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECHR

However, in a recent decision by the Grand Chamber, the ECHR
has shown reluctance in allowing a nation to limit a defendant's
access to evidence, even when the State cites national security
concerns due to alleged terrorist activities by the defendant. °0 In the
195. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (explaining that the
procedural rules of the Appeals Commission allow for the admission of evidence
that would otherwise be inadmissible in a court of law).
196. [2005] UKHL 45.
197. Id. 1 (explaining the case of Harry Roberts, who received a life sentence
in 1966 for murdering three police officers).
198. Id. 3 (noting that the reason for withholding evidence in Robert's parole
hearing was based on the government's fear of reprisal on the witnesses providing
the evidence).
58 (recognizing that the United Kingdom developed the closed
199. Id.
evidence procedures in response to dicta by the ECHR suggesting that such
procedures may be allowable under certain conditions). Lord Bingham in a
dissenting opinion admonished the use of the special advocate system, arguing that
the procedure makes the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention under the
European Convention "all but valueless." Id.; see also Clare Dyer, ParoleBoard
Can Use Terrorism Powers, Say Law Lords, GUARDIAN, July 8, 2005, at 16
(reporting that the appellant planned to file an application to the ECHR).
200. See Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99 (2005), http://www.echr.
coe.int/eng.

20051

EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER TORTURE

May 2005 decision of Ocalan v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber
recognized the complainant's denial of access to the evidence against
him as a restriction to the right of a fair trial.2°' In Ocalan, the
complainant's attorneys had limited access to the evidence, but the
State never allowed the complainant's attorneys a chance to speak
with the complainant about the evidence before his trial. 0 2 The
ECHR acknowledged that, had the complainant had knowledge of
the evidence, he "would have been able to identify arguments
relevant to his defense other than those which his lawyers advanced
without the benefit of his instructions. 2 3
Another case currently before the ECHR also has implications for
the issues set forth in this Comment. In the application of Ramzy v.
Netherlands,2° the ECHR will consider the use of secretive evidence
for prosecuting persons suspected of terrorism.205 The complainant in
the case risks being deported to Algeria, where he may face torture
by Algerian authorities, after Netherlands failed to convict him on
terrorism-related charges.20 6 The State court acquitted the
complainant due to the unknown origin of intelligence evidence
which the State used in its prosecution.2 7 Immediately following his
acquittal, the State detained the complainant and held him for
deportation.2 8 The United Kingdom is among a number of countries

201. Id.
138-44 (invoking the equality of arms doctrine and finding that the
denial of access to the evidence, in addition to other facts, so restricted the
complainant's rights as to deny him the right to a fair trial).
202. Id. (acknowledging the restrictions placed on the attorney's access to the
files as another condition that compounded the applicant's difficulty in attaining a
fair trial).
203. Id. 143.
204. App. No. 25424/05 (2005), http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
205. Id.; see also Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Application
Lodged with the Court Ramzy v. The Netherlands (Oct. 10, 2005) [hereinafter
Ramzy Press Release], available at http://press.coe.int/cp/2005/554a(2005).htm.
206. See Ramzy Press Release, supra note 205 (noting that the complainant
applied for asylum, but the Netherlands denied his request).
207. See id. (reiterating the State court's reason for dismissing the charges as the
government's refusal to explain the origins of the evidence so that the defense
could properly verify its accuracy).
208. See id. (noting that the Acting President postponed the deportation of the
complainant to Algeria while his case is before the ECHR).
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intervening in the case, arguing that the ECHR should consider
national security concerns against the potential for torture.2 °9
D. CONCLUSION
The importance of the detainees' case is apparent by the similarity
it shows to subsequent cases that have arose and will surely continue
to arise concerning the issue of torture-induced evidence used in the
prosecution of terrorist suspects. 210 As governments attempt to
quickly respond to the horror of terrorist attacks, the judicial systems
of many States are left to decide where government has crossed the
line with civil liberties. When the July 7, 2005 bombings in London
occurred, the U.K. government promptly began to consider
additional anti-terrorism legislation, namely the Terrorism Bill
2005.211 Among the provisions contemplated in the Terrorism Bill
2005 is a recently agreed-upon amendment that would allow law
enforcement to hold a person suspected of terrorism for twenty-eight
days before charging the suspect with a crime.21 2 It is obvious that
the possibility of detention without charge is finding its way back
209. See id. (listing the countries intervening in the case, including the United
Kingdom, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia).
210. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C.
2005) (ruling in the case of a group of Guantanamo detainees and asserting a U.S.
prohibition on torture-induced evidence in the context of U.S. military tribunals).
The district court discussed the possibility that the evidence against the detainees
was torture-induced. Id. at 473-74. The court also considered the detainees' lack of
access to the evidence against them and held that the complete denial of access to
the evidence deprived the detainees of a fair defense. Id. at 465-74. The court then
endorsed a procedure that would allow a representative for a detainee access to the
evidence against the detainee, but would preclude the detainee from the evidence.
Id. at 465-68.
211. Terrorism Bill, 2005, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/pabills.htm#t.
212. See 439 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 310-21 (debating whether the
time of detention allowable under the proposed legislation should be twenty-eight
days or ninety days); see also Letter from Andy Hayman, Assistant Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police, to Charles Clarke, Home Secretary (Oct. 6, 2005)
(setting forth arguments for a ninety day detention due in part to the international
scale of terrorism networks); Sam Coates, After All the Fuss Dies Down, What
Really Happened, TIMES (London), Nov. 10, 2005, at 9 (explaining the status of
the Terrorism Bill and reporting that Parliament refused to accept Prime Minister
Blair's ninety day proposal for detention, and instead agreed on a twenty-eight day
limit for holding persons suspected of terrorism).
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into the laws of one of the world's oldest democracies. Thus,
although the ECHR will not hear the case of the British detainees
discussed in this Comment, subsequent developments and similar
situations in like nations continue to suggest that the ECHR may lead
the way in curbing governmental power, as democratic nations
respond to terrorist attacks by disregarding well-established civil
liberties.

